December 25, 2013
A Thought for Christmas
The King of the Universe born in a stable can mean nothing less than the total subversion of the established social order. As I was contemplating this point this morning, I was reminded of a scene from Monty Python and the Holy Grail: as King Arthur rides by, one peasant says to another, "look! It must be a king." When the second peasant asks, "how do you know?" the first responds, "he's the only one who hasn't got [dung] all over him." The image of the king is of the clean, the privileged, the wealthy, the insider. But the story...
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December 20, 2013
Jacob Ross on the PSR
Leibniz famously claimed that, once we have endorsed the Principle of Sufficient Reason, "the first questions we will be entitled to put will be - Why does something exist rather than nothing?" The answer to this question, he further claimed, "must needs be outside the sequence of contingent things and must be in a substance which is the cause of this sequence, or which is a necessary being, bearing in itself the reason for its own existence, otherwise we should not yet have a sufficient reason with which to stop" ("Principles of Nature and Grace," sects. 7-8, tr. Latta). In...
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Topic(s):
Alexander R. Pruss
,
Contemporary Thinkers
,
Cosmological Argument
,
Existence of God
,
Explanation
,
G. W. Leibniz
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Jacob Ross
,
Metaphysics
,
Modality
,
Philosophy
,
Philosophy of Religion
,
Tyron Goldschmidt
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December 15, 2013
Kleinschmidt on the Principle of Sufficient Reason
Philosophers have perhaps more often assumed the Principle of Sufficient Reason than argued for it. Furthermore, this assumption has, in recent years, fallen out of favor due to the PSR's allegedly unacceptable consequences. Recently, however, the PSR has been defended by Alexander Pruss and Michael Della Rocca. Pruss and Della Rocca both argue that (a version of) the PSR is a presupposition of reason. Pruss defends a version of the PSR restricted to contingent truths and consistent with libertarian free will and indeterminism is physics as a presupposition of our scientific and 'commonsense' explanatory practices. Della Rocca argues that the...
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Topic(s):
Alexander R. Pruss
,
Contemporary Thinkers
,
Cosmological Argument
,
Existence of God
,
Metaphysics
,
Michael Della Rocca
,
Modality
,
Ned Markosian
,
Philosophy
,
Philosophy of Religion
,
Philosophy of Science
,
Shieva Kleinschmidt
,
Tyron Goldschmidt
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December 9, 2013
Oppy on Theism, Naturalism, and Explanation
In his contribution to Goldschmidt's The Puzzle of Existence, Graham Oppy argues that, "as [a] hypothes[i]s about the contents of global causal reality" (p. 51), naturalism is ceteris paribus preferable to theism. Oppy's strategy for defending this claim is to consider three hypotheses about the structure of global causal reality, and argue that naturalism is superior to theism on each hypothesis. Here are his three hypotheses: Regress: Causal reality does not have an initial maximal part. That is, it is not the case that there is a part of causal reality which has no parts that stand in causal relations...
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Topic(s):
Causation
,
Contemporary Thinkers
,
Cosmological Argument
,
Creation and Conservation
,
Existence of God
,
Graham Oppy
,
Grounding
,
Karen Bennett
,
Metaphysics
,
Modality
,
Philosophical Theology
,
Philosophy
,
Philosophy of Religion
,
Shieva Kleinschmidt
,
Timothy O'Connor
,
Tyron Goldschmidt
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December 6, 2013
O'Connor on Explaining Everything
Goldschmidt's volume opens with an essay by Timothy O'Connor who defends the traditional answer to the question of why there is something rather than nothing: God. More specifically, the traditional answer O'Connor defends holds that a necessarily existent immaterial agent chose that contingent beings should exist. There are several well-known difficulties for this kind of view. The first difficulty is, if there must be an explanation of why there are contingent beings, then mustn't there be an explanation of why there is a God? This is, of course, a version of the much-ridiculed 'what caused God?' retort, and O'Connor's (implicit)...
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