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Quote of the Day: Schopenhauer on the Absurdity of Materialism

The objective method [i.e. the method of philosophy which starts from the object and proceeds to the subject] can be developed most consistently and carried farthest when it appears as materialism proper. It regards matter, and with it time and space, as existing absolutely, and passes over the relation to the subject in which alone all this exists. Further, it lays hold of the law of causality as the guiding line on which it tries to progress, taking it to be a self-existing order or arrangement of things, veritas aeterna, and consequently passing over the understanding, in which and for which alone causality is. It tries to find the first and simplest state of matter, and then to develop all others from it, ascending from mere mechanisms to chemistry, to polarity, to the vegetable and animal kingdoms. Supposing this were successful, the last link of the chain would be animal sensibility, that is to say knowledge; which, in consequence, would then appear as a mere modification of matter, a state of matter produced by causality. Now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear notions, then, having reached its highest point, we should experience a sudden fit of inexhaustible laughter of the Olympians. As though waking from a dream, we should all at once become aware that its final result, produced so laboriously, namely knowledge, was already presupposed as the indispensable condition at the very first starting-point, at mere matter. With this we imagined that we thought of matter, but in fact we had thought of nothing but the subject that represents matter, the eye that sees it, the hand the feels it, the understanding that knows it. Thus the tremendous petitio principii disclosed itself unexpectedly, for suddenly the last link showed itself as the fixed point, the chain as a circle, and the materialist was like Baron von Munchhausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew his horse up by his legs, and himself by his upturned pigtail. Accordingly, the fundamental absurdity of materialism consists in the fact that it starts from the objective; it takes an objective something as the ultimate ground of explanation, whether this be matter in the abstract simply as it is thought, of after it has entered into the form empirically given, and hence substance, perhaps the chemical elements together with their primary combinations. Some such thing it takes as existing absolutely and in itself, in order to let organic nature and finally the knowing subject emerge from it, and completely to explain these; whereas in truth everything objective is already conditioned in such manifold ways by the knowing subject with the forms of its knowing, and presupposes these forms; consequently it wholly disappears when the subject is thought away. Materialism is therefore the attempt to explain what is directly given to us from what is given indirectly. Everything objective, extended, active, and hence everything material, is regarded by materialism as so solid a basis for its explanations that a reduction to this (especially if it should ultimately result in thrust and counter-thrust) can leave nothing to be desired. All this is something that is given only very indirectly and conditionally, and is therefore only relatively present, for it has passed through the machinery and fabrication of the brain, and hence has entered the forms of time, space, and causality, by virtue of which it is first of all presented as extended in space and operating in time. From such an indirectly given thing, materialism tries to explain even the directly given, the representation (in which all this exists), and finally the will, from which rather are actually to be explained all those fundamental forces which manifest themselves on the guiding line of causes, and hence according to law. To the assertion that knowledge is a modification of matter there is always opposed with equal justice the contrary assertion that all matter is only modification of the subject's knowing, as the subject's representation. Yet at bottom, the aim and ideal of all natural science is a materialism wholly carried into effect. That we here recognize this as obviously impossible confirms another truth that will result from our further consideration, namely the truth that all science in the real sense, by which I understand systematic knowledge under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason, can never reach a final goal or give an entirely satisfactory explanation. It never aims at the inmost nature of the world; it can never get beyond the representation; on the contrary, it really tells us nothing more than the relation of one representation to another.

     - Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, sect. 7 (tr. E.F. J. Payne)

Quote of the Day: Schopenhauer on The History of Idealism

Now as, notwithstanding the transitory, isolated nature of our representations with respect to their immediate presence in our consciousness, the Subject nevertheless retains the representation of an all-comprehensive complex of reality, as described above, by means of the function of the Understanding; representations have, on the strength of this antithesis, been viewed, as something quite different when belonging to that complex than when considered with reference to their immediate presence in our consciousness ... This view of matter, which is the ordinary one, is known under the name Realism. On the appearance of modern philosophy, Idealism opposed itself to this Realism and has since been steadily gaining ground. Malebranche [Kenny's note: Malebranche was a Platonist, not an Idealist] and Berkeley were its earliest representatives, and Kant enhanced it to the power of Transcendental Idealism, by which the co-existence of the Empirical Reality of things with their Transcendental Ideality becomes conceivable ... But Realism quite overlooks the fact, that the so-called existence of these real things is absolutely nothing but their being represented (ein Vorgestellt-werden) ... The realist forgets that the Object ceases to be Object apart from its reference to the Subject, and that if we take away that reference, or think it away, we at once do away with all objective existence. Leibnitz [sic], while he clearly felt the Subject to be the necessary condition for the Object, was nevertheless unable to get rid of the thought that objects exist by themselves and independently of all reference whatsoever to the Subject, i.e. independently of being represented. He therefore assumed in the first place a world of objects exactly like the world of representations and running parallel with it, having no direct, but only an outward connection with it by means of a harmonia proestabilitia; - obviously the most superfluous thing possible ... When, however, he wanted to determine more closely the essence of these things existing objectively in themselves, he found himself obliged to declare the Objects in themselves to be Subjects (monades), and by doing so he furnished the most striking proof of the inability of our consciousness, in as far as it is merely cognitive, to find within the limits of the intellect - i.e. of the apparatus by means of which we represent the world - anything beyond Subject and Object; the representer and the represented.

    - Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, tr. Karl Hillebrand, sect. 19

My Five Favorite Philosophers

Recently, while I was busy with finals, Clarke at Mormon Metaphysics and Johnny-Dee at Fides Quarens Intellectum posted lists of their favorite philosophers. I thought that today I would do the same. I won't get fancy with pictures and stuff, because that's not my style (as you can plainly see if you are looking at this page), but I do have a list, roughly in order (though there were certainly some ties that were hard to break):

1. George Berkeley (12 March 1685 – 14 January 1753). Berkeley is, in my opinion, the most underappreciated philosopher in all of history. Idealism aside, Berkeley is responsible for most of the (in my opinion) best parts of David Hume's philosophy, including most notably the collapse of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which led Hume to his 'veil of perception' doctrine (Hume acknowledged Berkeley's influence, though broad overviews of the history of modern philosophy often skip directly from Locke to Hume). Berkeley also, in the 17th century, developed a linguistic theory similar to that of the later Wittgenstein (the theory is in Alciphron 7; on it's resemblence to Wittgenstein, see Anthony Flew, "Was Berkeley a Precursor to Wittgenstein?" originally printed in W. B. Todd, ed., Hume and the Enlightenment, reprinted in David Berman, ed., George Berkeley - Alciphron in Focus). Finally, I previously argued that Berkeley may have been an influence on Kant's epistemology of metaphysics (though I may have overstated the case there, due to liking Berkeley and not knowing Kant very well). Then, of course, there is the fact that I actually believe most of what Berkeley says about metaphysics. Also, Berkeley is one of very few philosophers who, in my view, are capable of writing good philosophy and good literature at the same time. Both the Three Dialogs Between Hylas and Philonous and the Alciphron are exceedingly well written and a pleasure to read. These things earn him the number one place on my list of favorite philosophers.
2. Arthur Schopenhauer (February 22, 1788 – September 21, 1860) - Although Schopenhauer is not a theist, he provides useful thoughts for any idealist to consider. His primary influence on me is the he showed me the essential flaw in Hume's argument against libertarian free will: Hume argues that the world of sense is a 'veil of perception' and we can't see through it to the underlying reality, but he then uses arguments based on looking at the veil of perception in arguing against libertarian free will, despite the fact that we have direct, priveleged epistemic access to the mind, which is the object we are studying. In other words, Schopenhauer has me convinced that philosophy of mind, and especially free will, is a topic which must be studied phenomenologically. I also appreciate about Schopenhauer that his understanding of life reads a lot like Ecclesiastes without the last chapter. I wonder if, had he waited longer to publish or not been too proud to admit having been wrong in a published work, he would have discovered what Solomon discovered in his last chapter and not been remembered as the great pessimist. It's rather sad really. Whatever the case, Schopenhauer is a brillian philosopher and highly deservng of the number 2 spot on my list.
3. G. W. Leibniz (July 1 1646 – November 14, 1716) - Another underappreciated philospher. While Leibniz's total metaphysical system is a bit nutty, he's great for cherry-picking. That is, although his system is very tightly integrated with itself, it is often possible to pull very useful tidbits out of it for incorporation into less nutty systems. He is also just plain fun to read, partially because of his periodic nuttiness.
4. Plato (c. 427–c. 347 BC) - No list of best or favorite western philosophers should lack reference to Plato. Plato is inredibly brilliant, had relatively few shoulders to stand on (though the influences of Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and Socrates were all, of course, very important), and is also one of the few philosophers capable of writing good literature and good philosophy at once. His dialogs are a pleasure to read. He deals with a huge range of topics and influenced countless future philosophers. His philosophy was a big influence on early Christian thought as well (though, in the west he was, in my view unfortunately, mostly displaced by Aristotle around the tenth century - the Christian east continues to have strong Platonist leanings). His primary influence on me has been in his ethics, which may actually be more Socratic than Platonic, but Plato gets credit for writing them down. Of course, the Bible is the most important source for my ethical understanding, and especially my non-consequentialism, but Plato also played an important role. Plato really has me quite convinced that, even apart from human or divine punishment, one ought to behave morally for the simple reason that, at the end of the day, one has to live with oneself. Being around immoral people is unpleasant, and we can't get away from ourselves. I also more or less buy Plato's tri-partite division of the soul, which I think is roughly equivalent to St. Paul's (in fact, I think it is almost certain that Paul was familiar with at least the Republic and that it influenced his thought patterns).
5. Parmenides (Early 5th century, BC) - One of my favorite facts about the history of philosophy is that the earliest surviving deductively valid argument is found in a work that appeals to divine revelation - the poem of Parmenides! Here also is the first formulation of the logical Law of Non-Contradiction. Parmenides belief that "that which is" is a description picking out and fully describing one particular object, and Plato's later revision adding a realm of 'becoming' between being and not-being has been important to monotheistic theology as well: many accounts, especially those relying on ontological arguments, invovle the claim that God is the being that exists "the most" and this entails all of his other properties. Parmenides, or what's left of him, is also fun to read. I'm not joking or exaggerating when I say that I pray regularly for a complete copy of Parmenides' poem to be found.

You will notice a conspicuous absence of contemporary philosophers here. This is, unfortunately, due to a lack of familiarity on my part. I have read a not inconsiderable amount of contemporary philosophy, but I haven't read enough of any one particular contemporary philosopher to put him on a list of greats like this one. However, I will give honorable mentions to the following contemporary philosophers: Peter van Inwagen, Alvin Plantinga, Roderick Chisholm, William Lane Craig, and Richard Swinburne. The names on that list probably indicate immediately that most of the contemporary philosophy I read is philosophy of religion. I'm hoping to expand my knowledge of contemporary philosophy next semester when I will be taking undergraduate-level philosophy of religion and graduate-level contemporary metaphysics.

With that, I will pass the question on to the rest of you: who are your five favorite philosophers, and why?