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The Idealist Strategy

There is a particular strategy of argument generally employed by idealists in their arguments against materialism/physicalism/scientific realism and/or substance dualism. The strategy originates primarily with Berkeley. Some of the Parmenides fragments sound similar, but, absent context, it is not possible to determine exactly what he intended. Hume and Kant developed their metaphysical systems largely in response to it, and it is similar to the arguments of the so-called "modern Idealists" which Moore set out to refute. Finally, the strategy is, in recent literature, explicitly adopted in John Foster's The Case for Idealism, which I am currently reading. The strategy goes like this (note that I am not giving an argument, but an outline of an argumentative strategy):

1. Drive a wedge between perception and the underlying reality. This wedge must be sufficiently deep that it is no longer plausible to suppose that our assertions about the physical world could possible be describing both perception and underlying reality at once.


2. Argue that our physical statements - both ordinary statements about physical objects and statements about the discipline of physics - are best construed as talking about perception. Note that, given that this claim is part of the idealist's agenda, Moore's "two hands" argument - not to mention Samuel Johnson stomping on a stone or kicking his desk or whatever he did - is not an argument against idealism at all.


3. Argue (if this has not been established in step 1) that the underlying reality, while (presumably) responsible for the physical world and the orderliness of our perceptions, does not bear any resemblance to the physical world, or represent the physical world, or correspond to the physical world.

There have been a variety of takes on this strategy, but the strategy itself remains fairly constant, and is certainly held in common between Berkeley and Foster.

Though I find a lot of Foster's arguments problematic, his part 2, "the topic-neutrality thesis," is, I think, an excellent example of steps 1 and 2.

My Five Favorite Philosophers

Recently, while I was busy with finals, Clarke at Mormon Metaphysics and Johnny-Dee at Fides Quarens Intellectum posted lists of their favorite philosophers. I thought that today I would do the same. I won't get fancy with pictures and stuff, because that's not my style (as you can plainly see if you are looking at this page), but I do have a list, roughly in order (though there were certainly some ties that were hard to break):

1. George Berkeley (12 March 1685 – 14 January 1753). Berkeley is, in my opinion, the most underappreciated philosopher in all of history. Idealism aside, Berkeley is responsible for most of the (in my opinion) best parts of David Hume's philosophy, including most notably the collapse of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which led Hume to his 'veil of perception' doctrine (Hume acknowledged Berkeley's influence, though broad overviews of the history of modern philosophy often skip directly from Locke to Hume). Berkeley also, in the 17th century, developed a linguistic theory similar to that of the later Wittgenstein (the theory is in Alciphron 7; on it's resemblence to Wittgenstein, see Anthony Flew, "Was Berkeley a Precursor to Wittgenstein?" originally printed in W. B. Todd, ed., Hume and the Enlightenment, reprinted in David Berman, ed., George Berkeley - Alciphron in Focus). Finally, I previously argued that Berkeley may have been an influence on Kant's epistemology of metaphysics (though I may have overstated the case there, due to liking Berkeley and not knowing Kant very well). Then, of course, there is the fact that I actually believe most of what Berkeley says about metaphysics. Also, Berkeley is one of very few philosophers who, in my view, are capable of writing good philosophy and good literature at the same time. Both the Three Dialogs Between Hylas and Philonous and the Alciphron are exceedingly well written and a pleasure to read. These things earn him the number one place on my list of favorite philosophers.
2. Arthur Schopenhauer (February 22, 1788 – September 21, 1860) - Although Schopenhauer is not a theist, he provides useful thoughts for any idealist to consider. His primary influence on me is the he showed me the essential flaw in Hume's argument against libertarian free will: Hume argues that the world of sense is a 'veil of perception' and we can't see through it to the underlying reality, but he then uses arguments based on looking at the veil of perception in arguing against libertarian free will, despite the fact that we have direct, priveleged epistemic access to the mind, which is the object we are studying. In other words, Schopenhauer has me convinced that philosophy of mind, and especially free will, is a topic which must be studied phenomenologically. I also appreciate about Schopenhauer that his understanding of life reads a lot like Ecclesiastes without the last chapter. I wonder if, had he waited longer to publish or not been too proud to admit having been wrong in a published work, he would have discovered what Solomon discovered in his last chapter and not been remembered as the great pessimist. It's rather sad really. Whatever the case, Schopenhauer is a brillian philosopher and highly deservng of the number 2 spot on my list.
3. G. W. Leibniz (July 1 1646 – November 14, 1716) - Another underappreciated philospher. While Leibniz's total metaphysical system is a bit nutty, he's great for cherry-picking. That is, although his system is very tightly integrated with itself, it is often possible to pull very useful tidbits out of it for incorporation into less nutty systems. He is also just plain fun to read, partially because of his periodic nuttiness.
4. Plato (c. 427–c. 347 BC) - No list of best or favorite western philosophers should lack reference to Plato. Plato is inredibly brilliant, had relatively few shoulders to stand on (though the influences of Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and Socrates were all, of course, very important), and is also one of the few philosophers capable of writing good literature and good philosophy at once. His dialogs are a pleasure to read. He deals with a huge range of topics and influenced countless future philosophers. His philosophy was a big influence on early Christian thought as well (though, in the west he was, in my view unfortunately, mostly displaced by Aristotle around the tenth century - the Christian east continues to have strong Platonist leanings). His primary influence on me has been in his ethics, which may actually be more Socratic than Platonic, but Plato gets credit for writing them down. Of course, the Bible is the most important source for my ethical understanding, and especially my non-consequentialism, but Plato also played an important role. Plato really has me quite convinced that, even apart from human or divine punishment, one ought to behave morally for the simple reason that, at the end of the day, one has to live with oneself. Being around immoral people is unpleasant, and we can't get away from ourselves. I also more or less buy Plato's tri-partite division of the soul, which I think is roughly equivalent to St. Paul's (in fact, I think it is almost certain that Paul was familiar with at least the Republic and that it influenced his thought patterns).
5. Parmenides (Early 5th century, BC) - One of my favorite facts about the history of philosophy is that the earliest surviving deductively valid argument is found in a work that appeals to divine revelation - the poem of Parmenides! Here also is the first formulation of the logical Law of Non-Contradiction. Parmenides belief that "that which is" is a description picking out and fully describing one particular object, and Plato's later revision adding a realm of 'becoming' between being and not-being has been important to monotheistic theology as well: many accounts, especially those relying on ontological arguments, invovle the claim that God is the being that exists "the most" and this entails all of his other properties. Parmenides, or what's left of him, is also fun to read. I'm not joking or exaggerating when I say that I pray regularly for a complete copy of Parmenides' poem to be found.

You will notice a conspicuous absence of contemporary philosophers here. This is, unfortunately, due to a lack of familiarity on my part. I have read a not inconsiderable amount of contemporary philosophy, but I haven't read enough of any one particular contemporary philosopher to put him on a list of greats like this one. However, I will give honorable mentions to the following contemporary philosophers: Peter van Inwagen, Alvin Plantinga, Roderick Chisholm, William Lane Craig, and Richard Swinburne. The names on that list probably indicate immediately that most of the contemporary philosophy I read is philosophy of religion. I'm hoping to expand my knowledge of contemporary philosophy next semester when I will be taking undergraduate-level philosophy of religion and graduate-level contemporary metaphysics.

With that, I will pass the question on to the rest of you: who are your five favorite philosophers, and why?

Preserving Ambiguity in Translation

I'm studying Plato's Parmenides in a graduate seminar this semester. It is rather a baffling text, and there is a wealth of secondary literature which contains little consensus on anything. Today, as I was reading Constance Meinwald's guidebook to the dialog, I came across an issue in the translation of the text which I think is relevant to a number of discussion about Bible translation that I've had on-blog, and thought I would share. The issue is one of preserving a (probably intentional) ambiguity in the original in translation, and thus with the degree of interpretation done by translators, and the degree left up to readers of the translation.

What is usually referred to as "part 2" of the Parmenides consists of a series of deductions from contradictory hypotheses. The hypotheses in question are stated in the Greek as hen estin (137c4, etc.) and hen me estin (160c1-2, etc.). The 'standard' translation (that is, the one included in the Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper) by Mary Louise Gill gives two very literal translations. For the first hypothesis, in the main text Gill has "it is one" and in a footnote gives the alternate translation "one is." For the second hypothesis, Gill has "one is not" and doesn't give an alternate translation. This ambiguity applies to a huge number of statements throughout the dialog and seems to be intentional (more on that in a moment). Meinwald, citing Jowett, suggests (p. 30) that we can preserve that ambiguity if, instead of translations of the form "if the one is" we give translations of the form "on the hypothesis of the being of the one."

Now, if we did the latter in a Bible translation, many people who, like me, favor highly literal translations, would be up in arms about all the words we're adding. However, what I want to point out is that the more litaral translations are more interpretive than the looser ones. That is, because there are multiple possible literal translations of this particular phrase which have substantial differences in meaning, a literal translation requires the translator to pick one of those as the correct interpretation for inclusion in the main text, and thereby leaves fewer readings open in the English than are available in the Greek. That translator is here doing the interpreting and not leaving it to the reader.

To make matters worse, this probably isn't a case where we're simply not sure what Plato means, but a place where he is being ambiguous on purpose. The reason seems to be that the actual thesis of the historical Parmenides was simply "it is." He denied that "it" (that which is) was divided (DK28B8 line 22), and therefore, by implication, that it was plural. So the real hypothesis of Parmenides is that "that which is, is one," or, to put it in better English, "only one thing exists." But Plato's dialog is concerned with the theory of forms, and therefore he seems to use the phrase to mean "Oneness Itself exists." Thus the ambiguity seems to be necessary in order for the phrase to meet both the dramatic needs of the dialog (i.e. to be spoken by Parmenides) and the needs of Plato's philosophical purpose. This seems to be precisely the reason Meinwald embraces Jowett's translation.

To return to the question of the literalness and degree of interpretation of translations, it seems here that the less literal translation turns out to be more accurate. This result will be unsurprising to regular readers of the Better Bibles Blog, where such cases are on display regularly. What I really want to call attention to, though, is that the less literal translation actually involves less interpretation on the part of the translator and leaves more to the reader. This, as I understand it, is the main reason for those (again including myself) who favor more literal Bible translations. You will hear us say "I want a translator to tell me what it says, not what it means." While a certain degree of interpretation on the part of a translator is absolutely necessary, I do agree with that statement. However, as it turns out, there are some cases, such as this one, where that principle ought to cause us to lean toward a less literal translation. How about that?

Blogging Parmenides

I feel the need to point to this post about Parmenides over at Mathetes simply because ... well, because I approve of blogging about Parmenides! The post gives a good overview of Parmenides' argument for the establishment of monism. To which let me add three things:

1. This is the oldest deductively valid argument in surviving literature.


2. It is contained in a hexameter poem (written, presumably, in imitation of Homer and Hesiod) which begins with an appeal to divine revelation (a narrative about being carried in a chariot to meet a strange goddess who promises to reveal "the way of truth" and "the way of mortal opinions, in which there is no truth at all").


3. In addition to becoming the father of logic by being the first to (a) write down a deductively valid argument, and (b) formulate the principle of contradiction, Parmenides also becomes the father of metaphysics (according to me) by being the first person we know of to conceive of the possibility of "representation dualism."

My complements to Kristopher on his impeccable taste in blog subjects.