April 5, 2011
Quote of the Day: Confuting and Convincing
I think that as the proper end of our conference ought to be supposed the discovery and defence of truth, so truth may be justified, not only by persuading its adversaries, but, where that cannot be done, by shewing them to be unreasonable. Arguments, therefore, which carry light have their effect, even against an opponent who shuts his eyes, because they shew him to be obstinate and prejudiced. (Berkeley, Alciphron 4.2) This thought comes back at the end of the book, where Dion observes, "how unaccountable it [is] that men so easy to confute should yet be so difficult to...
Continue reading "Quote of the Day: Confuting and Convincing"
August 30, 2010
A Genuine Dialectical Problem for Ontological Arguments
Sobel spends much of the third chapter Logic and Theism
evaluating the dialectical status of ontological arguments, and, in particular, whether ontological arguers are entitled to the premise that it is possible that there be a perfect being. I am simply going to take the occasion here to state my opinion on the matter.
There is a fundamental dialectical tension in the ontological arguments that start from this premise. If, on the one hand, necessary existence follows trivially from the stipulated definition of perfection, then the argument will beg the question as Sobel suggests that Anselm's argument does
. That is...
Continue reading "A Genuine Dialectical Problem for Ontological Arguments"
August 24, 2010
The Dialectical Appropriateness of Ontological Arguments
After, for some reason or other, spending some 30 dense pages of Logic and Theism
on the laughable ontological arguments of Descartes and Spinoza, Sobel moves on to the more interesting argument advanced by Anselm. (The next chapter deals with versions of the argument set in modern modal logic, such as those of Hartshorne and Plantinga.) In my view, the Descartes and Spinoza arguments don't even look good; the Anselm version at least produces puzzlement, insofar as the reasoning looks valid, yet it seems, intuitively, that no such strong conclusion could ever be derived from such weak premises.
Sobel (fairly uncontroversially...
Continue reading "The Dialectical Appropriateness of Ontological Arguments"
Existence of God
Jordan Howard Sobel
Philosophy of Religion
Posted by Kenny
at 10:46 PM
| Comments (2)
| TrackBack (1)