Unlike most other recent writers on the subject, Sobel believes that the logical problem of evil - that is, the problem of showing that it is logically possible for God and evil to coexist - is a serious problem which recent treatments have not adequately dealt with. In his 12th chapter, he considers several deductive arguments from evil against the existence of God. In future posts, I will consider the specific arguments that Sobel makes, but here I just want to point out a flaw or limitation in the way Sobel frames his arguments.
Each version of the problem of evil Sobel considers has the following structure:
Now, perhaps Sobel does this because he thinks that, earlier in his book, he's shown that necessary being theism isn't one of the better versions of theism. I think he's wrong about that.
At any rate, this is, as I said, merely a technical problem; I think that each of Sobel's arguments has some intuitive pull which is independent of his problematic formalizations, and I will discuss some of them in future posts.
[cross-posted at The Prosblogion]Posted by Kenny at January 31, 2011 5:47 PM
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