Oppy on Theism, Naturalism, and Explanation
In his contribution to Goldschmidt's The Puzzle of Existence, Graham Oppy argues that, "as [a] hypothes[i]s about the contents of global causal reality" (p. 51), naturalism is ceteris paribus preferable to theism. Oppy's strategy for defending this claim is to consider three hypotheses about the structure of global causal reality, and argue that naturalism is superior to theism on each hypothesis. Here are his three hypotheses: Regress: Causal reality does not have an initial maximal part. That is, it is not the case that there is a part of causal reality which has no parts that stand in causal relations...
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Topic(s):
Causation
,
Contemporary Thinkers
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Cosmological Argument
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Creation and Conservation
,
Existence of God
,
Graham Oppy
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Grounding
,
Karen Bennett
,
Metaphysics
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Modality
,
Philosophical Theology
,
Philosophy
,
Philosophy of Religion
,
Shieva Kleinschmidt
,
Timothy O'Connor
,
Tyron Goldschmidt
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O'Connor on Explaining Everything
Goldschmidt's volume opens with an essay by Timothy O'Connor who defends the traditional answer to the question of why there is something rather than nothing: God. More specifically, the traditional answer O'Connor defends holds that a necessarily existent immaterial agent chose that contingent beings should exist. There are several well-known difficulties for this kind of view. The first difficulty is, if there must be an explanation of why there are contingent beings, then mustn't there be an explanation of why there is a God? This is, of course, a version of the much-ridiculed 'what caused God?' retort, and O'Connor's (implicit)...
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