September 2, 2023
Philosophy and Science Fiction, Unit 2: Personal Identity
The semester has now begun, but I'm still working on finishing up the additional scifi recommendations for the student assignments in my Philosophy and Science Fiction class. I've just finished unit 2. The task for unit 2 will be to analyze a work of science fiction in which it is unclear whether a character A is the same person as a character B, or in which it is unclear whether a certain person continues to exist over time. Required Reading FictionPhilosophy Week 1: The Problem and Why It MattersThe Twilight Zone, "Number 12 Looks Just Like You" (1964)Olson, "Personal Identity,"...
Continue reading "Philosophy and Science Fiction, Unit 2: Personal Identity"
July 25, 2014
Regarding All Those Possible Arnaulds
One of the main topics of the Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence is the question how, on Leibniz's theory, it can be true that Arnauld might have had children and been a physician rather than being a celibate theologian (see Arnauld's letter of May 13, 1686). One of the curious things that happens in this discussion is that both Leibniz and Arnauld start talking about the many Adams and many Judases and many Arnaulds in the various possible worlds, with Leibniz insisting that none of them is identical to the actual Adam/Judas/Arnauld. In that May 13 letter, Arnauld even speaks of 'several mes',...
Continue reading "Regarding All Those Possible Arnaulds"
October 22, 2008
"Can Berkeley's God Raise the Same Body, Transformed?'
My paper
"Can Berkeley's God Raise the Same Body, Transformed?", which is to be presented at the
Society of Christian Philosophers, Pacific Division conference next week is now available on the conference web-site. I would greatly appreciate any comments or criticisms.
Continue reading ""Can Berkeley's God Raise the Same Body, Transformed?'"
October 14, 2008
Minimalist Ontology and Familiar Object Talk
I have just finished reading Mark Johnston's 1992 paper, "Constitution is Not Identity," reprinted in Michael Rea's
Material Constitution: A Reader. After arguing against a variety of theories of material constitution, Johnston claims that, with regard to our talk about familiar objects, "the distinction it embodies is acceptable as it stands and what is bogus is the conception of justifying our practice which requires that, for the distinction to be justified, the difference between an
F and its constituting matter must be a deep metaphysical difference secured by an extra ingredient of the
F." (Rea, p. 58) Johnston calls the person who holds this view 'the Minimalist'...
Continue reading "Minimalist Ontology and Familiar Object Talk"
August 30, 2008
Quote(s) of the Day: A Pair of Responses to van Inwagen's "Body Snatching" Account of the Resurrection
Peter van Inwagen famously argued in his 1978 paper "The Possibility of Resurrection" that the only way God can bring a dead person back to life is to raise the very same body. However, if the body has decayed or been cremated, then it doesn't exist to be raised. Therefore, van Inwagen reasons, if Christianity is true, God must, at the moment of death (or immediately prior) surreptitiously remove the dead/dying body and spirit it away somewhere, replacing it with a simulacrum. Otherwise, there could be no afterlife. Unsurprisingly, this has met with some "incredulous stares." Here are a couple...
Continue reading "Quote(s) of the Day: A Pair of Responses to van Inwagen's "Body Snatching" Account of the Resurrection"