September 15, 2018
Catharine Trotter Cockburn on Berkeley's Immaterialism
I rather think we have that idea [of space] before we have any of extension in general, or are capable of abstracting: Nor does the mind frame it to itself; it is an idea early obtruded upon by the senses, and unavoidably perceived by it, as something without itself. This is all the proof we have, that matter is any thing really existing without the mind; and if the translator [Edmund Law, translator of William King's Essay on the Origin of Evil] will not admit of this evidence in behalf of space, but require some other proof, that it is...
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May 18, 2018
Berkeley and Lokayata
Berkeley famously argues that "what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived ... [is] perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them" (Principles, sect. 3). He aims to demonstrate this principle, he says, "In opposition to sceptics and atheists" (Three Dialogues, subtitle). As Berkeley saw it, human knowledge and traditional religion were under attack from 'freethinkers' and the root of this attack was the doctrine that real physical things must be something beyond or...
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Topic(s):
Epistemology
,
George Berkeley
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Lokayata School
,
Materialism
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Philosophy
,
Philosophy of Mind
,
Sense Perception
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April 24, 2017
Idealism and Christian Theology: Concluding Thoughts and Table of Posts
Having finished commenting on every chapter of Idealism and Christian Theology, allow me here to offer some concluding thoughts on the book and its aims and scope. First, some comments regarding scope. The title 'idealism and Christian theology' allows for a very wide scope. In the design of a volume like this, a judgment must be made about how broadly or narrowly the title is to be interpreted. Here, the title bears a relatively narrow interpretation in two respects, only one of which is explicit in the introduction. The explicit restriction of scope is that the volume considers only Berkeleian...
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Topic(s):
Contemporary Thinkers
,
George Berkeley
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Jonathan Edwards
,
Joshua Farris
,
Mark Hamilton
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Philosophy
,
Theology
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April 12, 2017
Arcadi on Idealism and the Eucharist
Chapter 10 of Idealism and Christian Theology is "Idealism and Participating in the Body of Christ" by James Arcadi. This article is very clearly written and handles both philosophy and theology well. However, I have some lingering concerns about the position defended. Arcadi begins with an admirably clear account of the spectrum of Christian positions on the metaphysics of the Eucharist. (I note, in passing, that during the Reformation and the early modern period, this was one of the most divisive questions in Christian theology, and differences over this question were at least as important as difference in soteriology in...
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April 11, 2017
Tan on Edwards' Christology
Chapter 9 of Idealism and Christian Theology is "Jonathan Edwards Dynamic Idealism and Cosmic Christology" by Seng-Kong Tan. The article addresses the relevance of Edwards' idealism to his accounts of the two central mysteries of the Christian faith, the Trinity and the Incarnation. Whereas most of the articles in this volume are primarily philosophical and deal with Christian theological commitments only at a rather basic level, this essay dives deep into the theology. Anyone not steeped in the history of these doctrines is likely to find it difficult to follow. I found it quite challenging myself, and will here only...
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Topic(s):
Augustine
,
Christology
,
Contemporary Thinkers
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Jonathan Edwards
,
Joshua Farris
,
Mark Hamilton
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Philosophy
,
Seng-Kong Tan
,
The Trinity
,
Theology
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April 6, 2017
Crisp on Edwards on the Incarnation
Chapter 8 of Idealism and Christian Theology is "Jonathan Edwards, Idealism, and Christology" by Oliver Crisp. This is the second of the two previously published essays, having appeared in another edited volume in 2011. The first part of the essay provides an admirably clear overview of Edwards' distinctive metaphysical views, particularly as they relate to God and creation. Crisp then goes on to draw out some consequences for Christology and defend the orthodoxy of Edwards' position. Crisp enumerates 11 Edwardsian positions he takes to be relevant, but it seems to me that there are really just three that are of...
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Topic(s):
Christology
,
Contemporary Thinkers
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Jonathan Edwards
,
Joshua Farris
,
Mark Hamilton
,
Metaphysics
,
Oliver Crisp
,
Ontology
,
Philosophy
,
Theology
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April 1, 2017
Cortez on Edwards on the Resurrection
Chapter 7 of Idealism and Christian Theology is "Idealism and the Resurrection" by Marc Cortez. Like the preceding article by Hamilton, this is an excellent piece of work directly addressed to the central issues of this volume. Cortez begins by noting that idealism, from the perspective of Christian theology, faces the problem of explaining the reality and importance of the body, and a particular example of this is the claim that there will be a bodily resurrection in the eschaton. In this respect, Cortez observes, Jonathan Edwards is a particularly interesting case since he is an idealist but also places...
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Topic(s):
Contemporary Thinkers
,
Eschatology
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Jonathan Edwards
,
Joshua Farris
,
Marc Cortez
,
Mark Hamilton
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Philosophy
,
Theology
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March 30, 2017
Mark Hamilton on Idealism and Fallenness
Chapter 6 of Idealism and Christian Theology is "On the Corruption of the Body: A Theological Argument for Metaphysical Idealism" by S. Mark Hamilton. This is easily the best essay in the collection so far, and the most directly focused on the central issues the volume purports to address. Hamilton provides a carefully documented account of the ways in which mind-body dualism is presupposed by theologies of our post-lapsarian state of corruption in Reformed dogmatics from Calvin to the early 20th century. Jonathan Edwards, he shows, is an outlier with respect to this tradition. Hamilton enumerates a number of theological...
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Topic(s):
Contemporary Thinkers
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Jaegwon Kim
,
Jonathan Edwards
,
Mark Hamilton
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Original Sin
,
Philosophy
,
Protestantism
,
The 'Reformed' Tradition
,
The Church
,
Theology
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March 27, 2017
Farris on Edwards on the Imago Dei
Chapter 5 of Idealism and Christian Theology is "Edwardsian Idealism, Imago Dei, and Contemporary Theology" by Joshua Farris. This is an interesting article that directly and constructively addresses one of the central theological issues raised by metaphysical idealism of the Berkeley/Edwards variety. However, I was left with some confusion about what the paper's overall lesson was meant to be. Farris frames the central question here as how, given Edwards' idealism, he can understand the imago dei doctrine in a way that does not devalue the body. Edwards is said to be drawing on but 'reconceiving' the prior tradition of Reformed...
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March 26, 2017
Yandell on Berkeley and Creation
The fourth chapter of Idealism and Christian Theology is "Berkeley, Realism, Idealism, and Creation" by Keith Yandell. This is an interesting paper on Berkeley which, unless I missed something, did not turn out to be about Christian theology at all. I say purposely that it did not turn out to be about Christian theology, because it sounds at the beginning as if it is going to be. Yandell begins by noting that Berkeley's position is rare among Christian thinkers (p. 73), and discussing a particular threat to Christianity from those who take the creation of matter to be impossible (p....
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March 18, 2017
Wessling on 'Idealistic Panentheism'
The third essay in Idealism and Christian Theology is "Idealistic Panentheism: Reflections on Jonathan Edwards's Account of the God-World Relation" by Jordan Wessling. The essay is avowedly not interpretive, but rather aims at an evaluation of a certain view in philosophical theology, dubbed 'idealistic panentheism,' which has been attributed to Edwards. This view takes the whole created world—including human minds—to be ideas in the mind of God. It is idealistic insofar as it takes reality to be fundamentally mental. It is panentheistic in a literal and straightforward sense: the created world exists in God's mind. However, it is not pantheistic...
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Topic(s):
Baruch Spinoza
,
Contemporary Thinkers
,
Creation and Conservation
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Jonathan Edwards
,
Jordan Wessling
,
Joshua Farris
,
Mark Hamilton
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Philosophical Theology
,
Philosophy
,
Theology
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March 16, 2017
Wainwright on Berkeley and Edwards
The second essay in Idealism and Christian Theology is "Berkeley, Edwards, Idealism, and the Knowledge of God" by William J. Wainwright. The aim of this article is to explore and explain similarities between Berkeley and Edwards in terms of the religious and cultural context in which they wrote, particularly the threat of deism and freethinking to these (relatively) traditional religious thinkers. This is an extremely interesting project, and it is for the most part well-executed, though the brevity of a single paper necessitates glossing over certain details, leaving some points underdeveloped, and so forth. Wainwright's central contention, I take it,...
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Topic(s):
Contemporary Thinkers
,
George Berkeley
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Jonathan Edwards
,
Joshua Farris
,
Mark Hamilton
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Philosophy
,
Theology
,
William Wainwright
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March 8, 2017
Spiegel on Berkeley and Orthodoxy
The first paper in Idealism and Christian Theology is James Spiegel's "The Theological Orthodoxy of Berkeley's Immaterialism." This piece was originally published in Faith and Philosophy in 1996, though I must confess that I had not read it before today. I found the essay rather odd, partly because I have some confusion about the nature of its project. Contrary to my expectations, it does not really address any of the questions I outlined in my last post. On the whole, I think the essay makes problematic unexamined assumptions about Berkeley's religion, and it relies on a controversial characterization of Berkeley's...
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Topic(s):
Anglican Communion
,
Bible
,
Contemporary Thinkers
,
George Berkeley
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
James Spiegel
,
Joshua Farris
,
Mark Hamilton
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Philosophy
,
Protestantism
,
Scripture and Tradition
,
The Church
,
Theology
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March 3, 2017
Idealism and Christian Theology: Introduction
I have been asked to review Joshua Farris and Mark Hamilton's Idealism and Christian Theology for Faith and Philosophy. In accord with a previous practice I have found useful, I will be blogging through the book, one post per chapter, in preparation to write the review. This post will be not so much a discussion of the book's introduction as my own way of framing and approaching the issues in the book. The fundamental paradox of theological anthropology in the Abrahamic tradition is the understanding of the human being as the breath of God dwelling in the dust of the...
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Topic(s):
Christology
,
Contemporary Thinkers
,
George Berkeley
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Jonathan Edwards
,
Joshua Farris
,
Mark Hamilton
,
Materialism
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Philosophy
,
Philosophy of Mind
,
The Eucharist
,
Theology
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November 15, 2016
Language and Structure Available for Pre-Order!
I am most pleased to announce that
Language and the Structure of Berkeley's World is now available for pre-order through
Amazon UK or direct from
Oxford University Press! It has not yet appeared on the US Amazon site. UK release is scheduled for March; US release for May. In addition to the information available on the Amazon and OUP sites, a detailed abstract can be found
here.
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September 30, 2016
"Berkeley on Unperceived Objects and the Publicity of Language"
Completing my summer research goals (only slightly late!), I've posted another new draft to my
writings page,
"Berkeley on Unperceived Objects and the Publicity of Language". The paper argues that when Berkeley's language of nature theory is interpreted in light of his own philosophy of language it produces a solution to the notorious problem of the existence of objects presently unperceived by humans.
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September 28, 2016
"What Descartes Doubted, Berkeley Denied, and Kant Endorsed"
I've posted a new draft, "What Descartes Doubted, Berkeley Denied, and Kant Endorsed," to my writings page. This is actually a rewrite of a much older paper; the original idea pre-dates my dissertation. In it, I argue (among other things) that Kant's fundamental complaint against Berkeley is that Berkeley's empiricism leaves him with cognitive resources too sparse for the construction of a genuine world. In particular, Kant targets Berkeley's rejection of the application of the concept of substance to perceived objects. Of course, in Language and Structure I argue that Berkeley is aware of these sorts of problems and develops...
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March 25, 2015
"Matter, God, and Nonsense: Berkeley's Polemic Against the Freethinkers in the Three Dialogues"
I have posted a new draft to my
writings page,
"Matter, God, and Nonsense: Berkeley's Polemic Against the Freethinkers in the Three Dialogues". The final version of the paper is expected to appear in
Berkeley's Three Dialogues: New Essays, ed. Stefan Storrie (Oxford University Press). In the meantime, comments are welcome.
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Topic(s):
Deism and Freethinking
,
Existence of God
,
George Berkeley
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Philosophical Theology
,
Philosophy
,
Philosophy of Language
,
Philosophy of Religion
,
Religious Language
,
Theology
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March 26, 2014
September 9, 2013
"Berkeley's Meta-Ontology: Bodies, Forces, and the Semantics of 'Exists'"
I've posted a new draft to my (recently reorganized) writings page, "Berkeley's Meta-Ontology: Bodies, Forces, and the Semantics of 'Exists'." This paper defends, in a relatively short space, some of the central conclusions which I defend at much greater length in my dissertation, Language and the Structure of Berkeley's World. Here is the abstract of the paper: To the great puzzlement of his readers, Berkeley begins by arguing that nothing exists other than minds and ideas, but concludes by claiming to have defended the existence of bodies. How can Berkeley's idealism amount to such a defense? I introduce resources from...
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February 23, 2013
Berkeley, Analogy, Matter, and God
On May 15, 1709 William King, archbishop of Dublin, preached a famous sermon (it was really more of a lecture in philosophical theology with a Scripture quotation at the beginning, but this was not too unusual in the Anglican Communion at the time) entitled "Divine Predestination and Fore-knowledg, consistent with the Freedom of Man's Will." The sermon was published shortly thereafter in both Dublin and London and is therefore now available on Google books. (I have written about King before.) King considers three atheistic arguments: the argument from the inconsistency of divine foreknowledge with human freedom, the argument from the...
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Topic(s):
Anthony Collins
,
Divine Attributes
,
George Berkeley
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Metaphysics
,
Philosophical Theology
,
Philosophy
,
Philosophy of Language
,
Religious Language
,
William King
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October 4, 2012
A Linguistic Argument for Immaterialism
I think Berkeley would endorse the following argument: The rules governing a bit of language cannot tell agents to perform or refrain from actions in certain circumstances unless the agents can recognize the obtaining or not obtaining of those circumstances prior to the introduction of that bit of language. A word refers to an object only if the rules governing that word tell the agent to behave differently with respect to the use of that word depending on whether that object is present. (E.g. a necessary condition of 'rabbit' referring to rabbits is that the rules governing 'rabbit' specify that...
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September 10, 2011
Berkeley, Commonsense, and Surprising Discoveries
Suppose (as happens often) that scientists, or philosophers, or explorers, or whoever, make some sort of surprising discovery, one that appears to be at odds with our commonsense view of the world. How should we react? It seems that there are three possible courses: either one rejects commonsense, or one rejects the alleged discovery, or one attempts to revise and/or reinterpret things to synthesize the two perspectives. An example: periodically results come out in neuroscience which purport to show that some brain event, of which the subject is unconscious, occurs significantly before a subject makes a supposedly free conscious choice,...
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April 26, 2011
Phenomenalisms, De Re and De Dicto
'Phenomenalism' is the name given to Berkeley's doctrine that the being (existence) of material objects consists in their being perceived (their esse is percipi - PHK 3). This formula is, however, several ways ambiguous. Here I just want to point out one of them. (I have been thinking about these issues in connection with a paper I am writing on the question of whether Leibniz was a phenomenalist, and, if so, of what sort.) The ambiguity I am concerned with here is a de re/de dicto ambiguity. De re is Latin for 'concerning the thing', and de dicto is Latin...
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February 19, 2011
Berkeley and Leibniz Should be Friends
In his 1733 Theory of Vision Vindicated, commenting on the prevalence of the deist and free-thinking movements in England and Ireland, and justifying his association of these views with outright atheism, Berkeley writes: That atheistical principles have taken deeper root, and are farther spread than most people are apt to imagine, will be plain to whoever considers that pantheism, materialism, fatalism are nothing but atheism a little disguised; that the notions of Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibnitz [sic], and Bayle are relished and applauded; that as they who deny the freedom and immortality of the soul in effect deny its being, even...
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Topic(s):
Baruch Spinoza
,
Contemporary Thinkers
,
Free Will
,
G. W. Leibniz
,
George Berkeley
,
Grace/Predestination
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Metaphysics
,
Philipp van Limborch
,
Philosophy
,
Philosophy of Mind
,
Pierre Bayle
,
Theology
,
Thomas Hobbes
,
Vere Chappell
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July 9, 2010
Authority, Authoritativeness, and Objectivity
I've just finished reading John Foster's new book, A World For Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism. Foster had previously defended idealism in his 1982 The Case for Idealism, and many of the basic arguments are the same, though I think the structure is cleaner and easier to grasp. (I've also just finished reading the restored version of Stranger in a Strange Land, so every time I write 'Foster' I'm thinking of the archangel - but that's beside the point.) The main motivation behind Foster's idealism, all the way back to 1982, is the thought that if anything is to...
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Topic(s):
Authoritativeness
,
Authority
,
Contemporary Thinkers
,
Ecclesiology
,
Epistemology
,
Ethics
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
John Foster
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Philosophy
,
Realism
,
Roman Catholic Church
,
The Church
,
Theology
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8:47 PM
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June 2, 2010
What is the Problem with Empiricism, Realism, and the Way of Ideas?
After discussing my last post offline with Lewis yesterday, I wanted to clarify this claim: "The argument points to serious problems with the combination of empiricism, realism, and the 'way of ideas.'" The problems I have in mind are difficulties with being justified in believing in, or perhaps even capable of expressing, realism. That is, there are certain views that seem natural if one accepts empiricism and the way of ideas which lead to the denial of realism. Here is, I think, the best example. Empiricism is an explanatory program for philosophy of mind which systematically favors explanations of the...
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Topic(s):
Empiricism
,
Epistemology
,
George Berkeley
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Metaphysics
,
Philosophy
,
Philosophy of Mind
,
Realism
,
Sense Perception
,
The Way of Ideas
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12:23 PM
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May 29, 2010
Can Immediate Perception Save Realism? (Hint: No)
As I mentioned in my last post, now that the term is over I am catching up on some stuff I've been meaning to read. Another item on that list is Georges Dicker's "Anti-Berkeley" which appeared in British Journal for the History of Philosophy in 2008. Dicker's aim is to show that many of Berkeley's arguments are good, but immaterialism, nevertheless, does not follow. Dicker thinks that Berkeley's arguments are best seen as showing us how to formulate a better version of materialism than the one common in Berkeley's day. So, for instance, Dicker thinks that Berkeley successfully refutes the...
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Topic(s):
Contemporary Thinkers
,
George Berkeley
,
Georges Dicker
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Philosophy
,
Philosophy of Mind
,
Realism
,
Sense Perception
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April 25, 2010
Quote of the Day: Turbayne on Alleged Refutations of Berkeley
The argument [for idealism] achieves [a proof of the external world] in a most ingenious yet simple way, by accepting the sceptical conclusion of one such as Hylas, that all we can ever know of the external world is certain ideas or appearances, and then admitting, as any consistent empiricist must, that these appearances are real. After all, it is a jest to hold, as do the philosophers, that the things we see and touch are mere illusions.[18] [18] This final step illuminates the irony inherent in Dr. Johnson's notorious ostensive refutation of Berkeley's 'ingenious sophistry', by exclaiming while 'striking...
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Topic(s):
Colin Turbayne
,
Familiar Objects
,
George Berkeley
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Immanuel Kant
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Philosophy
,
Quote of the Day
,
Realism
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9:42 PM
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March 27, 2010
How Reductive Theories of Mental Representation Lead to Phenomenalism
It seems initially plausible to suppose that mental representation can be reduced to phenomenal character. That is, we all know that when we think about things we get into certain states of mind, and there is such a thing as what it's like to be in that state of mind. Now, when we think about things, we are representing the world as being in certain ways. It is tempting to suppose that this representing can be explained entirely in terms of the what-it's-like (phenomenal character). According to naive forms of representative realism, this is because that phenomenal experience resembles the...
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February 8, 2010
A Simple Argument for Idealism
One of Berkeley's key arguments for his idealism (his positive view that the only fundamental entities are minds and ideas) is something like the following: (1)The gardener is justifiably certain that he waters the cherry tree daily. (2)One can be justifiably certain only of facts about one's own mind and its ideas. Therefore, (3)The gardener's belief that he waters the cherry tree daily is a belief about his own mind and/or its ideas. (1) is a 'common sense' premise, which Berkeley thinks we ought to preserve. (2) is supposed to have been shown by the skeptical considerations of Descartes and...
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December 2, 2009
Gupta and Idealism: My Project for the Next Two Weeks
It's been a while since I posted anything, and even longer since I posted anything other than Aristotle quotes - I have been busy trying to get my term papers underway. Since I don't expect to have any more time in the near future than I have had in the recent past, I thought I would keep things going around here by posting an outline of one of my projects. Below is a very rough draft of an introduction to one of my two papers (it doesn't have a working title yet) which describes what I hope to accomplish. Comments...
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November 7, 2009
Subjunctive Phenomenalism and Logical Construction Idealism
Within the last week, I have seen the same mistake in two different recent books on the philosophy of perception: According to phenomenalism, objects are (in John Stuart Mill's excellent phrase) "permanent possibilities of sensation"; they are, in a more recent idiom, "logical constructions" of sense data. (Alva Noë, Action in Perception, 79) Berkeley observed that the philosophical conception that the objects of direct awareness are sense-data (or, in Berkeley's terminology, "ideas") is perfectly compatible with the commonsense conception that the objects of direct awareness are ordinary things (e.g., tomatoes). We can accept both, Berkeley argued, if we recognize the...
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Topic(s):
Alva Noë
,
Anil Gupta
,
Bertrand Russell
,
C. I. Lewis
,
Contemporary Thinkers
,
Familiar Objects
,
George Berkeley
,
Historical Thinkers
,
Idealism/Phenomenalism
,
Kenneth P. Winkler
,
Metaphysics
,
Ontology
,
Philosophy
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November 2, 2009
Does 'The Desk is Black' Express a Proposition?
According to standard versions of subjunctive phenomenalism, such as the version developed by C. I. Lewis, sentences purporting to be about physical objects can be analyzed into long conjunctions of subjunctive conditionals having to do only with sense data and voluntary actions. It's very difficult to actually state these conditionals, but they are supposed to say things like 'if I'm in such and such a condition, and I do X, I will experience Y'. Alva Noë is not a phenomenalist, but he expresses some similar ideas about the nature of perception. Specifically, Noë argues that perception does not involve the...
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Topic(s):
Alva Noë
,
C. I. Lewis
,
Contemporary Thinkers
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Familiar Objects
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George Berkeley
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Historical Thinkers
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Idealism/Phenomenalism
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Metaphysics
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Ontology
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Philosophy
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Philosophy of Language
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Philosophy of Mind
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Sense Perception
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September 17, 2009
Quote of the Day: Berkeley on Combining Ideas Into Objects
One of the big questions in Berkeley interpretation is how and by whom ideas or experiences get put together to form objects. (See, for instance, the end of Margaret Atherton's recent paper "'The Books Are in the Study as Before': Berkeley's Claims About Real Physical Objects".) I've just noticed an interesting passage in Berkeley that ought to be really important to this discussion, though I don't think I've seen it quoted in this connection: [I]t ought to be considered that number (however some may reckon it amongst the primary qualities) is nothing fixed and settled, really existing in things themselves....
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August 27, 2009
Reductivism, Eliminativism, and Berkeley's Theory of Physical Objects
In present-day metaphysical discussions it is common to distinguish between 'reductivism' and 'eliminativism' with respect to some class of objects, C. These can be thought of as two different ways of denying the (fundamental, metaphysical) existence/reality of the objects in C. Examples of classes discussed by philosophers in this way include minds, conscious experiences, and macrophysical objects. The two views may be given a linguistic formulation as follows: Linguistic Reductivism (LR): Sentences which appear to assume the existence of the putative objects in C are strictly and literally true, although, in metaphysical rigor, the putative objects do not exist. (The...
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August 24, 2009
External Coherence and the Reality of The Matrix
David Chalmers writes: I think that even if I am in a matrix [i.e. any computer simulation similar to the one depicted in The Matrix], my world is perfectly real. A brain in a vat is not massively deluded (at least if it has always been in a vat) ... Philosophers have held this sort of view before. The 18th-century Irish philosopher George Berkeley held, in effect, that appearance is reality ... If this is right, then the world perceived by envatted beings is perfectly real: they have all the right appearances and appearance is reality ("The Matrix as Metaphysics"...
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May 14, 2009
A Semantic Argument for Phenomenalism
I believe an argument similar to the following can be attributed to Berkeley, but I have too much real work to do to go find the texts to justify it right now. (Which is why we have blogs, where we don't have to adequately justify our assertions!) The meaning of a word is exhausted by the correct conditions of its application. Any speaker S on any given occasion determines whether to utter a given word based entirely on S's subjective state (i.e. factors internal to S). Speakers consistently and non-accidentally use 'plain language' correctly (i.e. 'common sense' is correct). Therefore,...
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December 4, 2008
The Reason for Berkeley's Anti-Abstractionism
In my post,
Does Philosophy 'Trickle Down', I noted that "Berkeley thinks he has discovered two philosophical doctrines which are indeed 'the Chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the Sciences' and also 'the Grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion.' These are the epistemic/linguistic doctrine of
abstraction, and the metaphysical doctrine of
corporeal substance." In this post I want to examine how the doctrine of abstract ideas is supposed, according to Berkeley, to lead to "Error and Difficulty in the Sciences ... [and] ... Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion."...
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October 30, 2008
Quote of the Day: Berkeley's Own Summary of the Argument from Representational Realism to Skepticism
In a previous post, I summarized Berkeley's argument against representational realism. I just came across a very good passage in the Dialogues where Berkeley himself gives a summary of his argument that representational realism leads to unpalatable skeptical consequences: It is your opinion, the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things, but images, or copies of them. Our knowledge therefore is no farther real, than our ideas are the true representations of those originals. But as these supposed originals are themselves unknown it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they resemble...
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October 23, 2008
The Simplicity of Berkeley's Argument Against Representative Realism
A passage in T.E. Jessop's introduction to the Siris reminded me today of how simple Berkeley's argument against representative realism is. Jessop writes, "Such archetypes - material things as understood by the Cartesians and Locke - [Berkeley] rejected on the epistemological ground that they require a representative theory of perception, which logically entails scepticism, since it excludes the possibility of comparing the sensed object and the supposed 'real object'." (Berkeley, Works, ed. Luce and Jessop, vol. 5 p. 17) The argument, in all its simplicity, goes like this: Representative realism holds that, for each object of our experience, there exist...
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September 26, 2008
Quote of the Day: Appearances and Judgments About Appearances
And when we question whether the underlying object is such as it appears, we grant the fact that it appears, and our doubt does not concern the appearance itself but the account given of that appearance, - and that is a different thing from questioning the appearance itself. For example, honey appears to us to be sweet (and this we grant, for we perceive sweetness through the senses), but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance, but a judgement regarding the appearance. (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of...
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