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Leibniz and the Non-Identity Problem

Thanks to the work of the late Robert Adams, many philosophers are aware that, in his writings on the problem of evil, Leibniz anticipated Parfit's famous non-identity problem. I have not seen it noted before that Leibniz (implicitly) anticipates one of the most discussed objections to Parfit, and this is a key reason why non-identity is not a complete theodicy for Leibniz. The non-identity problem is this. Which sperm meets which egg is an extremely chancy business, highly sensitive not just to who couples with whom, but also when and how. Ensuring that your parents meet—or even that they marry—is...
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Finkish Backtracking Abilities

A disposition or ability is said to be 'finkish' iff, were the conditions for its exercise actual, the disposition/ability would be lost. (See Martin and Lewis.) For instance, imagine a sorcerer casts a spell on a fragile glass that will make it cease to be fragile if it is ever struck or dropped. (This example is due to Vihvelin. Realistic, non-magical examples are possible but more complex.) A fragile object is one that is disposed to break if struck, dropped, etc. The intuition is supposed to be that, given that the glass is intrinsically qualitatively identical to any other fragile...
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What is 'Acausal Thomism'?

In yesterday's post I discussed a view I called 'acausal Thomism'. I think I got the name from Tom Flint's article on divine providence in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, but I don't have the book with me now and the Google and Amazon previews are being uncooperative. In any event, in the comments on yesterday's post, both Mike Almeida and Brandon Watson suggested that this view was in need of clarification. I employed it in yesterday's argument, and I also said that I lean toward endorsing the view. So here I'll try to clarify exactly what I mean...
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